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1. The Problem
Insofar as we perceive the human body (our own and others) as we do any
physical object, it is legitimate to study it with the methods of biophysics,
and even of physics. In this respect, the Mind/Body problem is part of the
Mind/Matter problem.
It happens that in today’s physics, namely in Quantum Mechanics, the
status of what an object is is problematic. My objective here is to show that,
as a consequence, the point view of the so called cognitive sciences is perhaps
to be turned up side down. I will investigate whether it is pertinent, or not,
to see the Mind as an ”emanation from” the material body.
But, first of all, is there anything like ”Mind” at all? We live in a tech-
nical epoch where computers and drugs have the pretension to explain every
mental state in terms of mechanical tropisms. It is thus not useless, for the
sake of the human condition, to recall why a Weltanshauung with no Sub-
ject cannot explain the totality of everyone’s experience. There are several
ways to conduct such a demonstration, resting for example on the absence of
demonstrative foundations of the mathematical concepts used by the scien-
tific theories themselves. I will rather take my argument from the analysis of
Time. The decisive point is that there is nothing in physics allowing one to
speak of anything like the ”now”. The only way the express the now lies in
the symbolic dimension of meaning in language. It is customary for physicists
to think of language in terms of communication and exchange of information.
But the dimension of meaning is excluded from such a view. Thus, if one
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does not accept the immaterial notion of “meaning”, one is forced to exclude
anything like the ”now” or the present instant.
One could worry about the possibility or the necessity of exploring the
Mind/Body problem. This necessity is imposed by the empirical fact that we
are, in one way or another, entangled with a body partially described by the
methodology of physics and chemistry (leading for instance to the pharmaco-
logical care of our body). In Freudian Metapsychology, the Mind/Body link
is ensured by drive. It is the ”psychic representative of somatic excitations.”
But Quantum Theory has revolutionized our views of the soma which has
no more objective properties on its own. It has therefore become urgent to
revisit the Mind/Body problem in the light of quantum concepts. The inter-
esting outcome of a quantum perspective is that, as we shall see, it offers a
hypothesis for the way by which a mental representation changes the /state
of the body.
Several authors in the past, for instance Peirce, Heidegger, and Derrida,
have shown that the Mind is intimately involved with time. A rigorous in-
vestigation of the Mind/Matter problem thus requires some insight into the
concept of time. I will therefore make use of some results of recent elabora-
tions of this notion, in close connection with Quantum Mechanics.
2. A Brief Account on Quantum Mechanics and its
Problems.
Many authors are confused by the formulation of QM in plain language.
These formulations, if they are taken ”a` la lettre”, are often misleading. For
instance, everyone can understand a sentence such as ”the uncertainty of the
position of an electron is ∆x”. But, taken rigorously, it is incorrect, as we
shall see. It is therefore necessary to state first in a correct manner what QM
exactly says.
2.1 The general Framework of QM.
The conceptual framework of QM can be divided into two parts. It must
be noted that it is almost impossible to explain it correctly in plain language,
unless one makes use of metaphors. These metaphors are most often falla-
cious, so that I choose to make use, as simply as possible, of the language in
which physical concepts have been built.
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• Construction and ”Natural evolution” of an object
The usual textbooks on Quantum Mechanics start with the primitive
notion of ”system”: it is the object under study. But, in fact, an object
in Quantum Physics is different from objects of everyday experience:
it is constructed from sets of experiments. An experiment is the visible
outcome, expressed in a quantitative way with numbers, of a more
or less complex setup made of technical devices (e.g. a laser source,
polarizing filters and photocounters). The behavior of these setups
allows one to construct an abstract object like a ”photon” (or ”quantum
of light”).
Once the object, or system, is identified, there is attached to it a math-
ematical object called ”space of representations” (1). To a particular
configuration of the system is attached an element of this space. This
element is called ”state vector” or ”wave function” or simply the ”state”
of the system and is designated by ψ.
- Rule R1:
When the system evolves on its own, i.e. is not subject to an obser-
vation, ψ changes with time according to some evolution rule, called
the Schro¨dinger equation, or S-evolution. The rule R1 is deterministic
and at this level there is no ”free will of the atom”.
• Observation
But it is not sufficient to know the mathematical object ψ by which the
system is represented in the theory. Indeed, ψ is an abstract object,
while in the real life of a lab, in their experiments, physicists only ma-
nipulate macroscopic set-ups and numbers, representing what is usually
called ”physical quantities”. By physical quantity, I mean an actual set
up in a particular configuration, for instance the position of an index on
a ruler. Here we have a first level of ”free will”: the physicist is free to
choose which ”observable” he is going to measure or (equivalently) to
observe. It is therefore necessary to have rules saying how to compute
the numbers representing the result of a given measurement from the
knowledge of ψ. There are three such rules:
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– Rule R2.1
It is a procedure (never mind the details) giving the set of pos-
sible outcomes of a measurement. An essential characteristics of
the Quantum Theory is that the possible result of a measurement
is generally not unique; there is a set of several possibilities (finite
or infinite) called the ”spectrum” of that quantity for that sys-
tem. Let a1, a2, etc. be this spectrum (for instance, the different
positions of the index of a ruler).
– Rule R2.2
The potential, a priori, outcome is not unique, but the actual
outcome of an actual measurement is unique. There is a question
here: ”how is a particular outcome chosen?”, ”how can we predict
it?”. The answer is that the outcome is random; we can only
predict the statistical probability of it. The probability pi that
the outcome is ai can be computed, according to rule R2.2, from
ψ and ai
(2). If the probability pi is exactly 1 (i.e. 100%) for some
io, the outcome is certain and can only be aio and the system is
said to be in the state ψ = (aio).
We have now a second level of ”free will” in the sense that the
outcome is not deterministically predictible.
– Rule R2.3
Just after a measurement has been performed, a new measurement
of the same quantity will give the same result ai with certainty.
Thus after a measurement with an outcome ai, the state is (ai).
In other words, as a result of the measurement, the system has
suddenly jumped from the state ψ to the state (ai). This jump,
most often called the state vector reductionR or the wave function
collapse, is not deterministic, it has a random result. I call this
reduction ”evolution of type R”.
As we shall see, this rule is the source of all the interpretation
problems of the Quantum Theory.
There are therefore two types of evolution for a system: the S-evolution
and the R-evolution.
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Until now there is no problem with this scheme, at least apparently. But
a very serious problem arises when one wants to understand more precisely
what a measurement is. The natural reaction of a physicist is to view it
as a physical interaction between the system and an apparatus. This is an
a priori reasonable attitude since a physical device is made of atoms. But
then the system under study and the apparatus form together a metasystem
MS which evolves freely according to the S-evolution, which is deterministic.
But the rule R2.3 states that it evolves according to the R-evolution whose
outcome is only probabilistic. Therefore one is led to a contradiction between
two points of view: if a measurement is seen as a ”natural” physical process,
its evolution is in contradiction with the rule governing measurements.
Another way to express this paradoxical aspect is that, before a measure-
ment, a physical quantity does not ”possess” any definite numerical value
(for exemple the position of an electron). If one wants to try a complete
physical (in terms of an apparatus-object physical interaction) description
of the measurement, there is no longer any measurement (since there is no
more an R-evolution). This sounds like Zeno’s paradox: as soon as one tries
to catch the motion by a rational analysis, there is no more motion.
What is also paradoxical is that the choice between the S-evolution and
the R-evolution does not result from a physical process, but from an ar-
bitrary decision of the physicist who chooses to describe the situation as a
measurement or as a physical object-apparatus interaction. It is because this
arbitrary decision comes into the game that London and Bauer proposed as
early as 1938 that the state vector collapse, or R-evolution, is not a physical
process but takes place only in the ”observer’s consciousness”. I use quota-
tion marks since it is not clear what consciousness is. It was the introduction
of an idealistic wolf into a materialistic sheepfold.
This introduction of an (apparently) idealistic element into physics has
shocked many physicists. They generally either do no want to discuss these
matters, or try (a minority of them) to change the axioms of the theory.
2.2 Some proposed solutions to the measurement problem.
The above contradiction between S-evolution and R-evolution is, in my
opinion, the most crucial problem of physics. It has triggered many attempts
for a solution since the 30’s. Let me briefly mention, without unnecessary
details, the most elaborate.
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1. ”Hidden parameters”.
The idea is that the randomness of the R-evolution is only apparent.
There are supposed parameters, presently unreachable like the position
of the atoms of a gas for a 19th-century physicist, whose evolution gov-
erns the underlying dynamics of the system-apparatus metasystem. It
is only because these parameters have a random statistical distribution,
irreproducible from one experiment to another, like the random, but
deteministic, motion of atoms in a gas, that the R-evolution is, appar-
ently, unpredictible. This proposal has lived for several decades and
was a serious alternative to standard QM. In 1966, John Bell did show
that for a very large class of hidden parameters (namely local hidden
parameters), this kind of theory leads, in specific cases, to predictions
in contradiction for those of QM. An experiment (on the light emission
by atoms) was conducted in 1983 by Alain Aspect to test whether the
new theory or QM was correct. The result was that QM is correct,
thus excluding this kind of solution to the measurement problem.
2. ”No observation” interpretation.
According to this interpretation, there is no need for an R-evolution
and the rule R2.3 does not hold. All the possible outcomes of an ex-
periment (Rule R2.1) are simultaneously realized and there is a set
of simultaneous different observers, each one seeing one of the out-
comes. This interpretation, proposed by Everett, is usually called the
many world interpretation, although it is really a ”many observers”
interpretation. It has no internal logical contradiction, but it does not
explain a piece of empirical evidence: there is always only one actual
observer. There is a parallelism with time: in physics, there is no priv-
ileged instant such as ”now” on the time line, in contradiction with the
empirical evidence of the actual existence of ”now”. The reason for
these contradictions between the theory and empirical evidence is that
there is no way to express ”actuality” or ”existence” in a formal, math-
ematical way. It is a matter of the foundations of writing: an equation
is a written sign which, as such, is timeless, while actuality, being an
actualization, is temporal, in the sense of Heidegger’s Urtemporalita¨t.
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3. Decoherence.
The ”decoherence program” has tried to make use of the fact that
macroscopic objects (and thus apparatuses) are assemblies of elemen-
tary systems (atoms) which behave incoherently: their wavelike behav-
ior is statistically erased by destructive interferences of these waves.
But this decoherence does not explain why in a given experiment there
is only one outcome among many a priori possibilities. In this respect,
it fails to explain the behavior of an apparatus as an assembly of ele-
mentary quantal constituents (like atoms).
Thus neither of these solutions is satisfactory and we are led to find some-
thing else in order to understand what the R-evolution is.
3. The Semiotic Reduction of the State Vector.
Let us go back to the basic formulation of the quantum scheme and to
the actual practice of physicists.
The rule R 2.1 gives a prescription for the possible outcomes of a mea-
surement. We must ask ourselves what, in the real life of a lab, a measure-
ment does. More precisely, when, according to which criteria, after which
event, did a measurement really take place? A careful phenomenological
examination of this process leads to the conclusion that a measurement is
performed when its inscription has taken place. This inscription can be either
written or oral. In fact it could take place in any symbolic system. In other
words, the only ”interaction” involved in a measurement is the intervention
afforded by a signifier: it is only when a physical system is described in words
that a measurement can take place. In this view, the classical level exists
on its own, and the program of decoherence, namely to attain the goal of
understanding the quantum origin of macroscopic appearances is, by matter
of principle, hopeless. I therefore take as given, as a starting point, that a
measurement is nothing else than its inscription. J. Von Neumann, one of
the founder of QM, did in fact express a similar view: ”Indeed experience
only makes statements of this type “an observer has made a certain (subjec-
tive) observation”, and never any like this “a physical quantity has a certain
value” ”. To quote N. Bohr, ”By the word ”experiment”, we simply refer
to a situation where we can tell (3) others what we have done what we have
learned.” In fact, the word ”subjective” is unnecessary here. It is sufficient
that an observer states, or declares what he has observed. In fact in this
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statement, in this act of statement I should say, the observer as a subject
disappears behind his statement, and the latter thus acquires an objective,
or more precisely intersubjective, status. Thus, in real practice, an observa-
tion, or a measurement, is identical to its declaration. It is intersubjective
in the sense that a declaration is always shared by the interlocutors. The
communication scheme, according to which 1/ I first have in mind something
I want to communicate, and 2/ in a second time what was in my mind is after
the communication transfered in the mind of my audience, is in my opinion
wrong. The real situation is more atemporal. Time in the mental world
is not adequately represented by the real variable t, it involves ”afterward-
ness”, having thus a non linear character (which can be formalized rigorously
[Schneider 1994 and references therein]) and an instant is not a point. In the
framework of this mental time, I get an idea in my mind only afterwards,
when my interlocutor has received it. Finally, phenomenologically speaking,
an observation, as a declaration, only exists in the impersonal universe of
discourse.
One can make the following analogy with linguistics or with mathematics.
These sciences study statements (of natural language or of mathematics) for
themselves, and never either for the psychological motivations or detailed
physical mechanisms (acoustical for instance) underlying their production.
The question of understanding how individual subjects are articulated, or
linked, to the universe of discourse is another problem which I will not discuss
here and which requires more elaborated notions such as various identifica-
tions, incorporation and introjection, dual unity (Ferenczi, Melanie Klein,
Nicolas Abraham, Aulagnier).
To summarize, I adopt the hypothesis that
The R-evolution is a Speech Act
in the sense of Austin, that is, the act of production of a symbol, and not
a physical (i.e. independent from an observer) phenomenon since physical
phenomena strictly depend on S-evolutions. In the present case, this symbol
is a mathematical writing, or, to be more precise, the reading of a written
formula. Like any writing, it is not a static trail. As a verb, a writing is a
gesture, the gesture of a production of a symbol. A symbol is homogeneous
to its own production, it is its own production. This production takes place
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in the transcendental time of the emergence of an instant. It can be demon-
strated (Schneider 1994) that a transcendental instant necessarily has a cer-
tain chronological duration ∆T, in terms of our watches. This discretization
of transcendental time was already discussed, in different terms, by several
authors. Heidegger, for instance, names it ”spannung” and ”entstreckung” of
the present. I do not say ”in terms of physical time”. Indeed, it is misleading
to identify the mathematical variable t used by physicists with time in the
phenomenological sense of this word. The t variable, at least for values very
shorter than ∆T (”very short times”), is never directly apprehended as time,
but as a some number deduced from seizable quantities such as a length L
which is converted afterwards into t through relationships such as t = L/v
(where v is a velocity).
This theory of a transcendental time has no way to predict a priori the
value of the quantum ∆T. It is an empirical fact, in reality unexplained (even
by psycho-physiology), that ∆T is approximately 0.1 sec.
The combination of the existence of the ”lapse” ∆T attached to any signi-
fier and of the hypothesis that a measurement is the production of a signifier
(belonging to the world of physical quantities) leads to a definite prediction:
a measurement in Quantum Physics cannot be shorter than ∆T.
After a reduction R has taken place, it is not objectively stalled for ever.
If a second observer asks the first one what is the result of his measurement,
the answer of the first observer produces a new statement and thus a second
reduction R. This evanescence of the reductions R is perhaps similar to the
evanescence of the present: once an instant has been ”presentified”, it is im-
mediately superseded by another.
This model of a semiotic state vector reduction provides moreover an
explanation of an embarrassing fact, namely that it is not compatible with
relativity theory (because it is instantaneous everywhere or, equivalently,
taking place with an infinite speed). This incompatibily is well explained by
the semiotic state vector reduction: the semiotic state vector reduction being
a phenomenon of discourse, it takes places in the universe of interlocution
which provides a privileged, unique, frame of reference. Such a privileged
frame does not exist in the physical world, according to the theory of rela-
tivity, where all frames are equivalent.
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4. The Mind/Body Problem: Toward a Quantum
Psychology
(A model for an action of mental representations on the physi-
cal body).
In the past, a few authors, physicists and others, have elaborated some
thinking on the relationship between QM and the Mind/Matter problem.
Some physicists have built quantum models of the Mind/Body relation. A
useful partial account can be found in Stapp (1993 and 1997). For instance,
Costa de Beauregard (1966) has proposed that mental representations can
change the probabilities in rule R 2.2. More recently, Hameroff and Penrose
have tried to 1/ make an objective description of the R-evolution and 2/ pro-
pose that this R-evolution is consciousness. In the humanities, some philoso-
phers, psychologists or psychoanalysts and sociologists have used the QM
analogy as a model of the subject-object interaction or relationship (trans-
ference in the case of a psychoanalytical viewpoint). (See for instance S.
Viderman, J. Laplanche, S. Felman). This analogy should be investigated
carefully since the status of this interaction is slightly different in QM and
in the human world.
The idea of a semiotic state vector reduction is essentially that the re-
duction R is the production of a signifier. This production creates the result
of the measurement (instead of recording passively a matter of fact like in
Classical Physics) and changes the state of the system, according to the rule
R 2.3. Since we have up to now dealt with physical measurements, the
signifiers which are produced belong to the universe of physical concepts.
But the symbolic register has more dimensions than just conceptual ones.
It is much larger and includes signifiers (being possibly unconscious) having
esthetical, affective, ethical, etc. values. I make this statement in parallel
with the notion of drive in Freudian Metapsychology where, for instance, I
understand the destiny of the epistemophilic drive (as a sublimation) as the
production of a signifier having a conceptual value. Like the drive, any sig-
nifier takes its source from our soma. But what is the soma in QM?. Before
QM, it was an objective object. In QM, we have two heterogeneous notions,
as we have seen in part 2:
- the object under study (described by its state vector)
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- the properties or attributes given to the object by our perception of it.
Which one is our body? The state of the object, or its properties, or both?
I take the view that:
- as a physical object, the body is a system in the Quantum Mechanical
sense (an assembly of atoms) with no qualities
- as a phenomenal object, it is a system plus its attributes given to it by
our relationship to it.
If our relationship is a measurement, we get physical attributes; if it is an
affective relationship, we get symptoms.
For the physicist, the properties are descriptions of the system in terms
of physical concepts (or signifiers). But for the phenomenological approach
of each one of us, with our phantasmatic (sometimes unconscious) repre-
sentations of our body, it has appearances (”properties”) such as: beauty,
erotization of bodily zones, partial identifications, etc., for which physical
concepts are inadequate.
Let me give some specific examples.
1. ”Voluntary” action
When I decide to raise my hand, there is a global representation of this
action in my mind. This representation does not have the form of a
detailed physical description such as “the muscular fibers of this arm
will contract at such or such strength, etc.” There are global signifiers
”motion of my arm from position A to position B”. In the present
model, we have:
- the arm as a quantum system with no particular property
- each slight motion is then the result of the ”state vector reduction”
associated with the production of signifiers such as the above.
The accumulation of these slight motions gives the global motion of the
arm.
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2. Blushing of the face
Let us consider a signifier with an affective value. As an (affective)
representation, and thus production of an (affective) signifier, it can,
as an R-evolution applied to the system ”blood circuits of the face”,
change the apparent vascularization of the face, the latter appearing
thus as blushing.
A similar model can be invoked for hysterical somatisation or for psy-
chosomatic phenomena (such as some allergies) when the signifier is
unconscious or preconscious. It is irrelevant here to point out the disct-
inction between hysteria and psychosomatic affections. It is true that
in the case of hysteria there is no visible physiological affection, but at
the end, the entire body behaves differently as when there is no symp-
tom.
How could such a model be tested? One should be able to find two different
signifiers S1 and S2 which are incompatible in the quantum sense, i.e. such
that after an outcome for S1 the outcome for S2 is unpredictible. A question
arises here. Since psychological signifiers always refer to our body which is a
macroscopic system, can they be constructed as ”collective variables”?
A noticeable consequence is that there is no more ”psychophysical par-
allelism”. Indeed, the mental world is represented by the measurement op-
erators (and more exactly their proper values), while the physical body is
represented by the state vector. There is no parallelism between them.
The new hypotheses outlined above can serve as first steps for future
developments:
• read the classical important texts in metapsychology on the Mind/Body
relation through the lens of Quantum Physics.
• investigate the ”collective” observables (such as ”morphology” and
other qualitative features) given to the system.
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• investigate whether Quantum Physics can be extended to observables
whose result are not expressed in numerical terms. This is important
for the foundation of a truly quantum psychology.
I am grateful to Alan Bass for his help for the english style.
Notes:
(1) For experts, it is a Hilbert Space.
(2) Namely pi = F(ψ, ai) where F is, never mind the details, a simple
function having some given standard form.
(3) Underlined by me.
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Appendix
Indeterminism, Causality, Complementarity.
Quantum Mechanics has given rise to many comments in the field of
humanities, most of them misleading. Non-causality, complementarity, and
wave particle dualism are often refered to in unclear terms. These vague
notions are not really used in the technical works of physicists (even if they
use them for the layman). What is it really about?
Indeterminism only means that, before a measurement, one can generally
not predict its outcome. This word refers only to the measurement and not
to the behavior of quantum objects on their own, which is entirely detemi-
nistic (being governed by the S-evolution).
Complementarity has, somehow, a precise mathematical formulation, namely
the Heisenberg uncertainty relation ∆A.∆B ≥ h. But it is necessary to in-
terpret the latter correctly.
This relation bears exclusively on ”ensembles”, identical copies of a given
system, not on individual systems. ∆A (or ∆B) is not to be interpreted as
the ”uncertainty” of the knowlege of the quantity A (or B). The word uncer-
tainty does not have in Physics the same meaning as in ordinary language;
in ordinary language it means that an entity has a given value but that we
do not know what that value is. In Quantum Physics, a physical quantity
A, as a concept, does not possess a given value A on its own; only the result
of the measurement of that quantity exists. ∆A is then only the statistical
dispersion, around a mean value, of all the different measurements when re-
peated on many copies of the same system (in the same state). The smaller
∆A is, the better the precision on the mean value of A.
”Complementarity” then means nothing else than the statistical disper-
sions ∆A and ∆B cannot both be infinitely small for the same state of the
system under consideration. The expression ”the value of A” has no onto-
logical meaning and the statement ”A has the value A” has no meaning in
QM. The only meaningful sentence is ”the measurement of A has given, or
is predicted to give, a result A”. This emphasis on measurement rests on
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the same grounds as those of Relativity Theory which forbids one to refer
ontologically to the position or to the instant of an event: only their mea-
surements have a meaning.
The wave-particle dualism rest on a fact discovered by Louis de Broglie in
1923 - 1924: if a system is in a state ψ such that measurement of its impulse
has an exactly predictible outcome P, then the mathematical expression of
ψ is a wave with a wavelength λ = h/P (This is not a new postulate, it
is a consequence of the rule R2.1; h is Planck’s constant). In this case,
ψ has a spatially infinite extension and the measurement of the position
can give, with equal probability, a result anywhere in space. In that sense,
and only in that sense, the system has no assignable position. If the preci-
sion on P vanishes, so does, as a consequence of λ = h/P, the precision on
λ and the wave-like nature (or, more exactly, appearance) of ψ fades out.
As a particular case of ∆A.∆B ≥ h, one has here ∆x.∆P ≥ h (where x is
the position of the object under study). Thus, as the imprecision ∆P on P
(to be more exact the statistical dispersion on repeated measurements) in-
creases, the imprecision ∆x on x decreases. At the limit where ∆P becomes
infinitely large, the prediction of the results on position measurements be-
comes infinitely precise, a way to see the object as ”punctual” or corpuscular.
The ”wave-particle duality” is thus not ontological, but is the fact that, on a
given system, the predictions on the position measurements and the impulse
measurements cannot be both infinitely precise.
Non-causality. The ”natural” evolution of a system (without measure-
ment) is described by the Schro¨dinger equation and is absolutely determin-
istic. The non-causality, or the impossibility of making a prediction, bears
only on the outcome of measurements, and is possible because measurements
do not follow the Schro¨dinger equation.
Observer-system interaction. It is often said that complementarity, or
indeterminism, comes from the uncontrollable influence of the observer on
the observed system. This is not completely wrong, but, at the same time,
also not completely correct. What is the ”influence” of the observer on the
system? It is natural (especially for a physicist) to view this influence as a
material interaction between the system S and the observer (or its apparatus)
O. But then this interaction would be described by a Schro¨dinger equation
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bearing on the meta-system S + O. Since the Schro¨dinger evolution of S +
O is deterministic, the invoked ”influence” is in turn deterministic and thus
not ”uncontrollable”: there is no possibility of explaining by this way the
uncertainty ∆A on the measurement of A. The observer’s influence on the
system resides only in the, unpredictible, wave-packet collapse (which, in the
context of the present study, is of semiotic nature). For the semiotic state
vector reduction, there is only an interaction between symbols and the system
represented by ψ. This interaction can tentatively serve as a prototype for
the Mind/Body relation.
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